We study endogenous liquidity trading in a market with long-lived asymmetric information.
Introduction
Providing liquidity to investors who want to exchange financial assets for cash or vice versa without possessing superior information is a key role of financial markets [Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , Grossman and Miller (1988) ]. The choice problem faced by such liquidity traders and its effects on market performance are often overlooked in dynamic models of asymmetric information in financial markets. In this paper, liquidity traders endogenously determine the quantities they trade, taking information asymmetry and asset riskiness into account. We study the effect of endogenous liquidity trading on market performance and on the informed trader's incentives to acquire information and to release it to the market.
We propose a tractable model of endogenous liquidity trading and derive its equilibrium in closed form.
The results enable us to make qualitative and quantitative predictions on the effects of different types of information on liquidity, efficiency and welfare. We also formulate testable implications regarding the determinants of the spread, the nature of the price-adjustment process and the effects of changes in the investor base and in accounting rules on market liquidity, efficiency, information acquisition and research.
Our starting point is a multiperiod discrete time model based on Kyle (1985) , with an informed trader who obtains a noisy signal about the value of a risky asset. Information about the security's value also diffuses to the market as an independent process. We model liquidity (uninformed) traders as risk-averse agents with idiosyncratic liquidity preferences. Each liquidity trader chooses her order size, and competitive market-makers price the security at its expected value given all publicly-available information.
In equilibrium, the risk-neutral informed trader maximizes his expected profit, and risk-averse liquidity traders maximize their expected utilities.
We find that endogenous liquidity trading leads to qualitatively different equilibrium characteristics compared to dynamic models with pure noise trading. Our analysis shows that models with exogenous liquidity trading are likely to overestimate the speed of information dissemination. We also find that both liquidity and efficiency are increasing functions of agents' discount rates, and decreasing functions of the liquidity traders' risk aversion.
We distinguish between intractable, tractable and public information. Intractable information cannot be acquired: its release is entirely exogenous, and it is unavailable to the informed trader, to the marketmakers and to the liquidity traders. In contrast, tractable information can be acquired by the informed trader, creating informational asymmetry. We find that intractable information increases the adverse selection spread although it does not involve informational asymmetry. Further, intractable information increases the sensitivity of the spread to asymmetric information and to the liquidity trading interest.
Making information asymmetry endogenous reduces market efficiency. When the informed trader chooses how much information to acquire, he takes into account the effect of his choice on liquidity traders' behavior, which creates an incentive to limit the information asymmetry. We find that even at zero information acquisition cost, he may still choose not to acquire all the tractable information he could. This is in contrast to traditional noise trading models, where he would acquire all available information when it is free. Further, there is an interaction between the amount of intractable information and the informed trader's information acquisition strategy: other things equal, he will acquire less tractable information when there is more intractable information.
We show that insider trading can increase the welfare of liquidity traders by reducing the risk they face.
Thus, the informed trader provides a valuable service, which is paid for by his trading profits. However, he may have an incentive to acquire more information than the amount that maximizes liquidity traders' welfare. These results can contribute to the debate regarding the costs and benefits of insider trading [cf. Manne (1966) , Glosten (1989) , Fishman and Hagerty (1992) ] and provide a framework for structuring and quantifying the tradeoff between them.
When the informed trader is allowed to release some of his private information to the market, his strategy is characterized by two regions in the parameter space: For low amounts of intractable information, he chooses to acquire all available information and release most of it. In this case, voluntary information disclosure may improve market efficiency. On the other hand, when the intractable information is high, the informed trader acquires a fraction of the tractable information without releasing any of it. Hence, our results suggest that intractable information reduces efficiency by curtailing both the acquisition and release of information.
A number of studies consider information acquisition and release in financial markets [cf. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Kim and Verrecchia (1991) , Demski and Feltham (1994) , Verrecchia (2001) , and references therein]. Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) study the effects of information release when the insider is required to disclose the quantity he had traded at the end of each trading round. Under this requirement, the insider uses a "dissimulation" strategy which adds random noise to his trades, so the market-makers cannot perfectly infer his information. They find that this form of disclosure accelerates price discovery and lowers insider profits compared to Kyle (1985) . Unlike Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) , where noise trading is exogenous, in our model information release actually makes the informed trader better off as it induces liquidity traders to increase their trades.
The information acquisition decision depends on whether its outcome can be observed by the market.
When the informed trader's investment is unobserved, if the information acquisition costs are low, he acquires more information compared to the case where his investment is observed. In contrast, with high information acquisition costs, he may choose to acquire less information than in the observable case. In all cases, however, his profits decline as a result of unobservability. Thus, the informed trader has an incentive to hire an independent auditor to monitor his information acquisition investment and report it to the market. We show that hiring an outside auditor benefits not only the informed trader, but the liquidity traders as well.
A number of studies, building on Kyle (1985) , examine the effect of long lived private information with inelastic noise trading [cf. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) , Foster and Viswanathan (1996) , Back and Pedersen (1998) , Back, Cao, and Willard (2000) , Baruch (2002) ]. Several studies examine the choices made by uninformed traders in static or short-lived private information environments [cf. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , Foster and Viswanathan (1990) ]. Foucault (1999) models reservation prices as the sum of asset value and a trader-specific component; Glosten and Milgrom (1985) use different discount factors as drivers of different valuations. Glosten (1989) was the first to introduce liquidity traders with hedging motivations in a market with information asymmetry. Using uninformed traders who trade to hedge their initial positions, Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) build on the one-period Kyle (1985) model to show that each uninformed trader trades so as to decrease the absolute value of her position in the risky security. While in both Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) and our model, uninformed traders' decisions are endogenous, the trading motivations are different: our liquidity traders satisfy disparate liquidity preferences, whereas in Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) , they hedge their positions in the risky security. 1 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents our discrete time model and derives the equilibrium. Section 2 introduces our continuous time model and derives its equilibrium characteristics.
Section 3 extends the model to the cases where information acquisition is endogenous and disclosure of private information is allowed. Our concluding remarks are in Section 4. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1 The Model
Model and Notation
Our model is based on Kyle (1985) . The market for a risky security operates for T periods. Trading takes place between times 0 and 1 at points t τ , 1 ≤ τ ≤ T , where 0 = t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < ... < t T = 1. We define ∆t τ = t τ − t τ −1 , 1 ≤ τ ≤ T , and call the period that ends at t τ "period τ ". A dollar paid at the end of period τ is discounted by 1 + r τ ∆t τ .
There are three types of market participants: liquidity traders, an informed trader and market-makers.
In our model, liquidity traders decide what quantities they will buy or sell by trading off their desire to effect an execution against their expected losses to the informed. Bagehot (1971) viewed the market-maker as a conduit between liquidity traders, who trade because they want to exchange securities into cash or vice versa without delay, and insiders, who possess superior information which they can monetize through trading. 2 Formally, Kyle (1985) studied the equilibrium among an informed trader, noise traders and competitive market makers. Kyle modeled noise trading as being exogenous, i.e., the quantity traded by the liquidity traders is not sensitive to their expected losses to the insider.
Liquidity Traders
Liquidity traders are willing to pay a fee (buy each share at a premium or sell each share at a discount, the difference between which is the bid-ask spread) in return for immediacy of execution. A liquidity trader's willingness to pay for immediacy reflects the urgency of her willingness to trade, which in turn is determined by idiosyncratic, private factors. Examples include cash needs in response to an emergency or an unexpected opportunity, the desire to balance a suboptimal portfolio, the desire to minimize the tracking error of an investment that was designed to meet a specific target, or the need to reduce a short position. Such liquidity trades are characterized by an idiosyncratic opportunity cost of failing to trade at a given point in time, which reflects the liquidity trader's particular circumstances as opposed to information about the future value of the security.
Similar to earlier market microstructure models that focused on liquidity trading [e.g., Garman (1976) , Whitcomb (1978, 1981) , Amihud and Mendelson (1980) , Ho and Stoll (1981) , Mendelson (1982 Mendelson ( , 1985 Mendelson ( , 1987 ], we assume that liquidity traders are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for immediacy. Thus, although all liquidity traders have the same expectations regarding the security's final value, each has a different willingness to pay for immediate execution, which reflects her private liquidity preference. In Garman's (1976) classical model and related work, heterogeneous liquidity preferences create a downward-sloping demand curve and an upward-sloping supply curve that reflect the arrivals of buyers and sellers to the market, respectively. Thus, if the market's mean valuation of the asset is p, then liquidity trader i's private valuation of the asset is p +ũ i , where E[ũ] = 0.
Our model handles both liquidity trading and information asymmetries, combining the early-marketmicrostructure approach with Kyle's. In our model, there is a continuum of liquidity traders. Each liquidity trader has a mean-variance utility function U (w), where w is the wealth generated by her trade. 3 For a liquidity trader arriving at time t with immediacy value u, the utility from buying z shares is given by E [W (v, p, u, z) ]−a τ V ar [W (v, p, u, z) ], where W (v, p, u, z) 
. A negative value for z means that the trader actually sells z shares of the asset. τ =1 ∆η τ , where ∆η τ are independently normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ω τ ∆t τ ; η represents the publicly released information independent of the informed trader's private information (this information may include, for example, macroeconomic data or news concerning relevant industry segments). After trading takes place at the end of period τ , ∆η τ is revealed to the market. We define
The Informed Trader, Market Makers and Sequencing of Events
At each period τ , the informed trader submits an order to buy or sell a quantity of the security without observing the liquidity traders' orders. Competitive market-makers, who cannot distinguish between liquidity-motivated and informed order flow, price the asset at its expected present value given the information available to the market at that point. The security's price at the beginning of the first period is p 0 . We denote the end-of-period-τ trading price of the security (before ∆η τ is revealed) by p τ . At the end of period T (i.e., at t = 1), ξ is publicly disclosed. On the other hand, can be fully disclosed, partly disclosed or not disclosed at all.
The market-makers' pricing function at τ is p τ = P τ (∆V τ , p τ −1 ), where ∆V τ is the observed net order flow. Let x τ (ξ, p τ −1 ) denote the informed trader's order size function in period τ and z jτ = Z jτ (u jτ ) the order size function of liquidity trader j at τ . Let X τ be the security position of the informed trader, accumulated from t = 0 through the end of period τ .
Definition of an Equilibrium
.e., F τ is the public information set at the end of period τ . The discounted future profit as of the beginning of period τ for the informed-trader by following the strategy {x τ }, τ ≥ 0 is given by
An Equilibrium satisfies the following requirements:
(a) In each period τ , each liquidity trader maximizes her utility given available information: For a liquidity trader arriving at period τ , 1 ≤ τ ≤ T and indexed by j:
(b) The informed trader maximizes his expected profits:
(c) The market-makers set prices efficiently, that is, the market pricing function satisfies:
Analogous to Kyle (1985) and subsequent studies, we concentrate on equilibria in linear strategies. That is, the quantities placed by the informed trader satisfy
The market-makers' prices satisfy
The liquidity traders' order quantities satisfy z jτ = γ jτ u jτ , for some
is an equilibrium where all participants play linear strategies. A symmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium in which all the liquidity traders arriving in the same period play the same function (Z(u, p 0 )) as their respective strategies. Note that each liquidity trader has her own immediacy premium u jτ , so the liquidity traders end up buying or selling different quantities although they play the same strategy in a symmetric equilibrium. We define the market uncertainty about the informed trader's signal at the end of period τ
Equilibrium Outcome: Discrete-Time Model
Proposition 1 Assume that
There exists a unique symmetric linear equilibrium in which {π τ } satisfies:
for some {α τ } and {δ τ }. 
with second order conditions
The irrelevance of φ τ is a direct result of semi-strong form efficiency. Since in equilibrium, the price reflects all publicly released information, the price deviation resulting from a public announcement is always zero.
Since the informed trader cannot act on this information, the associated coefficient is irrelevant.
The equilibrium outcome for different clearing frequencies, as well as its convergence to the continuous time equilibrium, which we derive next, is depicted in Figure 1 . Assumption (7) assures there is sufficient liquidity trading interest relative to the information asymmetry so an equilibrium exists. Clearly, this assumption is satisfied for any given parameter set if the number of liquidity traders is large enough.
Continuous Time Model
The dynamics of trading and information dissemination is best studied in a continuous time model, where traders' actions are not constrained by one or more discrete trading epochs. Further, the continuous time analysis allows us to obtain key closed form results.
Model and Equilibrium Outcome
Here, the market operates in continuous time over the interval [0, 1] u who arrives at t, the utility from buying z shares is given by E [W (v, p, u, z) ] − a t V ar [W (v, p, u, z) ], where 
withΣ ( 
4 The first condition prevents (potential) liquidity trading from being unstable, and the second prevents degeneracy. 
In equilibrium, λ η (t) = e − 1 t rsds and φ is irrelevant. Figure 1 demonstrates the convergence of the sequence of discrete time equilibria to the continuous time equilibrium.
INSERT FIGURE 1
With no discounting and constant liquidity trader risk aversion, we have the equilibrium outcome in closed form. We define M = 
The equilibrium error variance is
The equilibrium strategies for the liquidity traders and the informed trader are
and
Equilibrium Characteristics

Determinants of Market Liquidity
To study the determinants of market liquidity, we define a partial order among functions on The first result suggests a market-wide relationship between interest rates and illiquidity. Intuitively, an increase in the discount rate decreases the importance of future risk for liquidity traders. As the discount rate increases, liquidity trading in the early periods intensifies, resulting in higher market depth. The empirical implication is that liquidity changes systematically with interest rates: the higher the interest rate, the higher the liquidity [measured, for example, by the market impact cost; cf. Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauterbach (1997)] . One can also test the interaction of the interest rate and the longevity of private information suggested by our model. Other things equal, lower interest rates are equivalent to a smaller opportunity window for trading on private information; differences in the due dates or frequencies of financial reports can be used as proxies. For instance, prior to 1970 Form 10-K had to be filed within 120 days after a company's fiscal year ended. This was shortened to 45 days. Foreign companies are required to file annual reports on form 20-F within 6 months of their fiscal year-end. Also prior to 1970, companies
were not required to file full financial disclosures quarterly; disclosure requirements were made in 1970
and expanded in 1981. Differences in these requirements can be correlated with the longevity of private information and be used to test how interest rates affect liquidity.
Consistent with Kyle (1985) , as the potential liquidity trading interest increases, the market becomes more liquid, so increasing µ or σ 2 decreases λ, and as the information asymmetry increases, the market becomes less liquid. Further, if ω increases, more information about the security's value is autonomously revealed to the market, reducing the security's riskiness and increasing liquidity trading. Hence, if ω increases, λ decreases.
Part (iv) of Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 show that other things equal, an increase in the total variance reduces liquidity and increases the adverse-selection component of the spread. Thus, the adverse-selection spread increases in both the informational asymmetry and the overall uncertainty about the security's value. Empirically, this implies that the adverse-selection spread should be an increasing function of the security's total risk. This result is reminiscent of Ho and Stoll (1981) , who found that the inventory component of the spread increases with total risk. An interesting empirical test would examine a cross section of securities, separate out the adverse selection component of the spread [cf. Huang and Stoll (1997) , Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) ] and test, using appropriate controls, the relationship between the adverse-selection spread and total risk. 7
Our model implies that the adverse-selection spread should increase with the uncertainty about events that are totally unpredictable and involve no inside information. Thus, the time series behavior of the 7 Huang and Stoll (1997) separate out the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread using a time series model. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) estimate the probability of information-based trading using maximum likelihood estimation based on a theoretical microstructure model. adverse-selection spread should be correlated with measures of macroeconomic and market-wide uncertainty. For example, the uncertainty about exchange rates that have an effect on the security's value should be positively correlated with the adverse-selection spread. Additional empirical implications follow from the cross-partial derivatives of the market impact coefficient (λ 0 ) given in Corollary 1. We have the following result.
Corollary 2 With r t = ω t = 0, and a t = a for all t ∈ [0, 1],
While exogenous noise trading models imply that noise trading reduces the spread, part (i) of Corollary 2 shows that the slope of the spread on the liquidity trading interest M should be larger in absolute value for more risky securities. Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno (1999) measured M via the proportion of individual shareholders, as "informationless trades are typically associated with small, individual shareholders who buy or sell small quantities of the stock," and found that this measure was positively correlated with liquidity. Our result means that the effect of changing the investor base on liquidity (i.e., the slope coefficient) should be larger for riskier securities. Similar cross-effects can be tested using the size distribution of trades to quantify the amount of liquidity-motivated trading.
Part (ii) of the Corollary says that larger total uncertainty about the security or the environment increases the negative effect of information asymmetry on market liquidity. This means, for example, that an upward shift in the uncertainty about macroeconomic variables or economic outlook will increase the coefficient of the adverse selection spread on measures of information asymmetry. Finally, part (iii) shows that the sign of the cross-partial of the market impact parameter with respect to information asymmetry and liquidity trading interest is negative, as in Kyle (1985) .
Market Efficiency
In Kyle (1985) , changes in the liquidity trading interest have no effect on market efficiency and in equilibrium, market uncertainty decreases linearly: Σ(t) = Σ 0 (1 − t). One expects an increase in liquidity trading volume to affect the diffusion of private information to the market. In fact, increased liquidity trading has two opposite effects. On the one hand, it induces more aggressive informed trading, resulting in faster information dissemination and a more efficient market. On the other hand, liquidity trading adds noise, which makes it more difficult to infer the security's value from the market price. In Kyle (1985) , the two effects are perfectly offsetting and efficiency is independent of market parameters. Figure 2 presents the effects of several parameters on efficiency for our model. Figure 2A compares the percentage of private information incorporated in the market in our model, (1 − Σ(t)), to that of the Kyle model, (1 − Σ 0 (1 − t)), for various levels of µσ 2 . As µσ 2 increases, price efficiency decreases for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, increased liquidity trading interest reduces informational efficiency for all t -a major difference between our model and Kyle's.
The effect of increased r on market efficiency is illustrated in Figure 2B . As the discount rate increases, information dissemination is accelerated, the market becomes more efficient, and more liquidity trading takes place early on. Figure 2C demonstrates the effect on efficiency of changing the residual uncertainty (Ω). As Ω increases, so does the overall riskiness of the security, which reduces the informed trader's ability to hide his orders and results in faster information dissemination to the market. Increased residual uncertainty also makes liquidity trading less elastic. Hence, as Ω gets larger, the equilibrium approaches Kyle's (e.g., for Ω = 5, Σ(t) is almost linear). Figure 2D shows the effect of the rate of public information release, ω, on the error variance of the signal. Faster public information release slows down information dissemination about the informed trader's signal. This is because as ω increases, the uncertainty about the liquidation value of the asset decreases through the end of the trading period, which increases liquidity trader aggressiveness at that time. This, in turn, induces the informed trader to trade less aggressively earlier and more aggressively later, holding back information from the market. Note that the first order effect of an increase in ω is to increase the amount of liquidity trading at all times.
INSERT FIGURE 2
In the standard Kyle (1985) model, Σ(t) declines linearly, i.e., as 1 − t. In our model, Σ(t) declines concavely as
3
(1 − t), resulting in slower information dissemination and a less efficient market. This difference invites an empirical test of the price-adjustment process.
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, and with constant µ and σ 2 , the residual market uncertainty for both the Kyle model and ours can be written as
where ψ 0 , ψ 1 and ζ are constant parameters. Under the Kyle model, ζ = 1, ψ 0 = ψ 1 = Σ 0 and ψ 2 = 0, whereas for our model, ζ = 3 and ψ 0 , ψ 1 and ψ 2 can be derived from equations (22)- (23).
The speed of price adjustment has been tested for a number of different models in the literature [cf.
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999) and references therein]. Similar to Biais et al., let I t denote the information set available to the market at the end of period t.
This means that for any instrumental variable y in I t−1 , we have the condition
Hence, taking a fixed time horizon, using the closing price of the last day in the sample as a proxy for v [cf. Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999) ] and the lagged prices as instruments, we can construct a GMM estimator for the parameters ζ, ψ 0 , ψ 1 and ψ 2 and test the hypothesis ζ = 1 versus the alternative ζ = 3.
Informed Trader Profits Proposition 4 (i) The informed trader's expected ex-ante profits are given by
(ii) When r = ω = 0 and µ, σ 2 and a are constant, the informed trader's expected ex-ante profit is given
The informed trader's profits increase with µ and σ 2 , which is intuitive. Moreover, they are decreasing in Ω, since higher residual uncertainty results in less liquidity trading and a thinner market. However, the effect of Σ 0 is non-monotonic, which has implications on the informed trader's information acquisition decisions examined next.
Endogenous Information Acquisition and Market Efficiency
We now allow the informed trader to decide how much to invest in information acquisition, a decision that drives his informational advantage. We first assume that the informed trader's investment is observable by the market; in Section 3.4 we consider the case where it is unobservable.
Consider our model with no discounting and constant µ, σ 2 and a. The informed trader can choose to learn about v by privately observing an ex-ante N (0, Σ 0 ) distributed part of it, ξ. This observation leaves an independently distributed portion of v, say , unobserved. Let = 0 + 1 , where 0 denotes the component that he cannot acquire, and 1 is the component that he could have acquired but chose not to. That is, v = ξ + 1 + 0 , where 1 + ξ represents the information the informed trader can acquire, which we call tractable information, and 0 is the information he cannot acquire, which we call intractable information. Let ξ, 1 and 0 be independently normally distributed with means p 0 , 0 and 0 and variances Σ 0 , Λ − Σ 0 and Ω 0 , respectively. Thus, the variance Σ 0 is endogenously determined by the informed trader and is observed by all market participants. We assume without loss of generality that at t = 1, the tractable We now have a two-stage game with the informed trader maximizing his expected net profit by first choosing how much to invest and then exploiting his informational advantage through trading. Hence, the informed trader first determines Σ 0 and Ω = Ω 0 + Λ − Σ 0 . Taking these as known parameter values, the market then operates as described in Section 2.
8 The intractable information 0 may be fully or partially revealed or not revealed at all.
Market Efficiency
To derive the equilibrium outcome of the endogenous information acquisition problem with an observed investment level, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (i) The expected trading profit of the informed trader for a chosen non-negative
(
Note that the net expected profit of the informed trader will be E[π 
Proposition 5 says that when investment in information is observable and Λ is sufficiently large relative to µσ 2 , then even for a low information acquisition cost, the informed trader chooses to limit the amount of information he acquires. This is driven by the endogeneity of liquidity traders' decisions, which reduces his profits when the informational asymmetry is large. Information acquisition costs aside, the informed trader is facing a trade-off between two effects: On the one hand, higher Σ 0 translates into superior information along with increased volatility, that translate into greater profit opportunities; but on the other hand, greater informational asymmetry reduces the volume of liquidity trading, resulting in a thinner market, which in turn reduces his expected profits. This effect is best illustrated by the following proposition, which shows that the informed trader limits the amount of information he acquires even when information acquisition is free.
9 The value of x * up to first six significant digits is 0.137055. 
There exists a Λ c such that
is strictly increasing in µσ 2 and strictly decreasing in Ω 0 .
Proposition 6 shows that even when information acquisition is free, the informed trader may choose not to obtain all of it. This will never happen when liquidity trading is inelastic. Figure 3 presents the expected profits of the informed trader as a function of the initial error variance (determined by the amount of information he acquires). When Λ/µσ 2 is smaller than x * , absent information acquisition costs, the informed trader wants to acquire full information. However, as Λ/µσ 2 becomes smaller, his profits are higher with less than full information.
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With endogenous liquidity trading, efficiency is lower than is implied by models with exogenous noise trading. First, as shown in Section 2, information is disseminated more slowly, resulting in concave time patterns of the market's value uncertainty (Σ(t) + (Λ − Σ 0 )). This is related empirically to the price adjustment process. Second, the informed trader may not acquire all tractable information even at zero cost. The latter effect is captured by the price jump at t = 1, p(1 + ) − p(1 − ), which can be interpreted as the surprise due to an announcement. The ratio of the price jump variance to the variance of the tractable
, is a measure of market inefficiency: the higher R J , the less efficient the market price. The following corollary examines the effects of intractable information on R J when c = 0 and the intractable information is not publicly released at t = 1.
Corollary 3
(a) There exists an m * ≥ 4Λ such that
(b) Suppose no part of 0 is revealed to the market at t = 1. Then, there exists an
Corollary 3 can be applied to the price reaction to earnings announcements. Part (a) suggests that at times when, or for securities for which, the uninformed investor base is larger, the price reaction following the announcement is smaller. As the investor base increases, the market becomes more liquid and the reaction to more asymmetric information declines, inducing the informed trader to acquire more information. Part (b) suggests that at times when, or for securities for which, the intractable information is larger, the price reaction following the announcement should be larger even though no part of the intractable information is released with the announcement. Across securities, these results can be related to the findings of Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn (1987) , Ball and Kothari (1991) , Zeghal (1984 ), Atiase (1985 , Bamber (1987) , Freeman (1987) and Ro (1988) that market reaction to earnings announcements are more pronounced for small firms than larger ones, 10 as firm size is likely to be positively related to the size of the uninformed investor base and negatively related to the amount of intractable information about the firm.
A more direct test of the uninformed investor base (µσ 2 ) effect can use the percentage of small investors [cf. Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno (1999) ] or trade-size-based measures as proxies. Then, a cross-section study can relate the stock price jumps at earnings announcements to the uninformed investor base. A test of the relation between the price jump on the announcement and Ω 0 can examine its dependence on accounting regimes, using cross-country comparisons with appropriate controls. Ω 0 can also reflect macroeconomic or other market-wide uncertainties, suggesting a time-series test of the relation between earnings coefficients and market-wide uncertainty.
Information Acquisition and Liquidity Trader Surplus
The following proposition examines how the amount of information asymmetry, Σ e 0 , affects liquidity traders' welfare in equilibrium. Using this result, we derive the optimum amount of private information that maximizes liquidity traders' surplus.
Proposition 7 (i) The expected welfare of liquidity traders, defined as the sum of their expected utilities, is given by
By Proposition 7, the amount of information asymmetry that maximizes liquidity traders' welfare, Σ w 0 , is strictly positive: some information asymmetry is always beneficial to them. However, to maximize his own profits, the informed trader acquires more information than is optimal for liquidity traders. Yet, with low information acquisition costs, liquidity traders' welfare is still higher with the informed trader than 10 For related accounting literature, see Lev and Ohlson (1982) , Bernard (1989) , Lev (1989) and Kothari (2001). without it. This is in contrast to pure noise trading models, where liquidity traders would always prefer zero informational asymmetry.
Voluntary Information Disclosure
Assume that after acquiring his private information, the informed trader can release some of it to the market before trading starts. Would he choose to do that? Because information release decreases the market's uncertainty about the security's value, it encourages liquidity trading and can increase the informed trader's profits. On the other hand, the more information the informed trader releases, the lower his informational advantage. The informed trader has to decide on the amounts of information to acquire and release so as to maximize his profits. The information release can be viewed as the release of a noisy signal about the informed trader's signal. Equivalently, the informed trader's information can be interpreted as a collection of independent, verifiable bits, and he can decide how many bits to release publicly. 11
This logic can apply, for example, to the case of a financial institution that spends resources to acquire information about a security. The institution bases its own trades on the information gathered by its research. The institution may have an incentive to release some of its information to reduce uncertainty and coax liquidity traders into trading higher quantities. Clearly, it would not be in the institution's best interest to release all of the information at its disposal, since this would eliminate its entire informational advantage. Hence, the institution may choose to add some form of noise or release only partial information.
We model voluntary information release using the following timeline. First, the informed trader chooses how much to spend on information acquisition and acquires private information accordingly. Second, he decides how much of the acquired information to release. Then, all other market participants update their beliefs and finally the market operates as before. We denote the variance of released information by Σ r (≤ Σ 0 ), i.e., for the market, the conditional variance of ξ after the information release and before trading starts is Σ 0 − Σ r . In addition, we assume Ω 0 > 0.
The informed trader's problem is equivalent to choosing Σ 0 and Σ r to maximize his expected trading profits less the cost of information acquisition:
where
Denote the amount of information the informed trader acquires in equilibrium, a function of Λ, Ω As Ω 0 increases, the profit-maximizing strategy shifts from acquiring all available information and releasing some of it to acquiring less information and releasing none. Figure 4C shows the percentage of available information that the informed trader acquires (Σ 0 /Λ) and Figure 4D shows the percentage of information that he chooses to release (Σ r /Σ 0 ) for a range of values of Λ and Ω 0 . For low Λ, it is more profitable to obtain all available information and release none. For high values of Λ, when Ω 0 is not too high, it is still optimal to obtain full information, but in this case he chooses to release most of it.
In summary, the informed trader chooses between two modes of operation: Obtaining all available information and releasing some of it; or obtaining part of the available information and keeping it entirely to himself. The sharp transition between the two modes is a result of the bimodality of his objective function. Figure 4B shows how the global optimum shifts from one local optimum to another, resulting in a sharp change in strategy. Figure 4C shows that for lower Ω 0 and Λ values, the market is fully efficient in the sense that by the end of trading, all information available for acquisition is incorporated in the security's price, whereas for large intractable information (Ω 0 ), most of the information available for acquisition is not incorporated in the price. The reason for this is that when the amount of intractable information is large, it slows down liquidity trading and makes acquiring and relasing information less profitable for the informed trader. As a result, he chooses not to acquire much information and not to release any of it when Ω 0 is large. Hence, intractable information has a significant impact on the amount of tractable information that gets incorporated in price by the end of trading. In general, the option to release information improves market performance. Not only does the market become more efficient-liquidity also increases. Information release alleviates the incentive to acquire less information (Section 3.1) and creates better alignment between the incentives of the informed and liquidity traders.
The foregoing results suggest that intractable information is an important driver of information acquisition and release strategies. Empirically, accounting regimes and firm disclosure policies affect the amount of intractable information. For example, cross-country differences in accounting practices and requirements affect information tractability. When a non-U.S. firm lists for trading in the U.S., this typically makes some intractable information tractable. Our results in Section 2.2.1 imply that this should increase the stock's liquidity and result in a smaller bid-ask spread even in its home market. The results in this Section show that, in addition, this will increase the amount of information collected and analyzed about the firm, resulting in a more efficient market.
More broadly, accounting policies that provide better access to investors and analysts (thereby increasing tractability) should result in both lower bid-ask spreads and more information acquisition and assimilation about the firm. Within the U.S., tractability can be proxied by the FAF scores developed by the Association for Investment Management Research-Financial Analysts Federation to evaluate the disclosures provided by the firm's annual reports, other publications and its investor relations department.
For example, Lang and Lundholm (1996) found a strong correlation between FAF scores and the number of analysts following the firm, after controlling for other factors. Across countries, the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research [cf. Rajan and Zingales (1998) ] developed the CIFAR index that quantifies the quality of accounting regimes for 49 countries and can be used as a measure of information tractability in cross-country comparisons as well as in studying the effects of international listings.
INSERT FIGURE 4
Unobservable Information Acquisition Investment
In this section we examine the rational expectations equilibrium when the information acquisition investment is not observable. 12 In equilibrium, the market conjectures the correct amount of information acquired by the informed trader and the informed trader's best strategy is consistent with the market's conjecture. 13 Let Σ en 0 be the informed trader's acquired information in equilibrium when his decision is not observable. The equilibrium outcome for this case is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 9 If the informed trader's information acquisition decision is not observable, then there is a unique equilibrium. Define
12 We thank an anonymous referee for inspiring this analysis. 13 The observable case (Section 3.1) trivially satisfies this condition.
In equilibrium, unobservability can only reduce the informed trader's profits. Also, by Proposition 9, if the information acquisition cost is zero (c = 0), the informed trader will always acquire full information.
Similarly, if the acquisition cost is low, the informed trader will acquire near-full information. Building on the discussion of Section 3.2, this reduces liquidity traders' welfare by pushing the information asymmetry further away from their welfare-maximizing level. This effect is especially severe when Λ is close to µσ 2 /4.
In this case, with low information acquisition costs and unobservability, the informed trader acquires near full information, λ 0 approaches infinity, trading volume approaches zero and the equilibrium resembles a "no trade" situation, hurting all market participants. Making his investment information acquisition observable can effectively remedy this undesirable outcome.
Because unobservability can only hurt the informed trader, he has an incentive to credibly inform the market of his information acquisition decision. In particular, he can hire an independent auditor to monitor his information acquisition investment and report it to the market. At zero cost, this is always (weakly) beneficial for the informed trader. Now suppose the auditor charges a fee κ ≥ 0. If hired, the auditor observes the informed trader's investment level and reports it to the market before trading starts; then the equilibrium unfolds as in Section 3.1. If the informed trader chooses not to hire the auditor, his investment level is unobservable and the equilibrium outcome is given by Proposition 9. Clearly, the informed trader will chose to hire the auditor as long as κ is lower than the difference between the profit levels with and without observability. figure) , the curves for the observable and unobservable cases intersect. For low levels of Λ, the informed trader acquires more information when the acquisition decision is observable. The reason is that when his decision is observed by the market, the increased price reaction to higher degree of information asymmetry increases the price volatility, which, in turn, increases his expected profits. For high values of Λ, the negative effect of information acquisition on liquidity prevails, inducing him to acquire less information when his decision is observable.
Which curve the informed trader will actually be on depends on the audit fee and information acquisition cost. Figure 5 shows the endogenous decision on hiring the auditor for κ = 0.1. When c = 0, for an extended range of Λ values he has no incentive to hire the auditor and acquires full information, which leads to zero price jump variance. Beyond a threshold value of Λ, however, the benefits of observability exceed the audit fee, inducing him to hire the auditor. When c = 5, the price jump curve shifts modes twice. For low Λ, the difference in profits due to observability is small and the informed trader chooses not to hire the auditor. In the middle range, observability substantially affects the amount of information acquired and consequently improves the informed trader's profits. Hence, he chooses to hire the auditor and the price jump curve coincides with the observable case. However, as Λ increases, market uncertainty leads to illiquidity, which reduces the gains from observability to a level that does not justify the audit costs. Hence, the informed trader again chooses not to hire the auditor and acquires more information than he would under observability, reducing the price jump. Finally, when information acquisition costs are very high (e.g., c = 25), the informed trader cannot acquire enough information to justify the audit fees. Therefore, he chooses not to hire the auditor, and his information acquisition remains unobservable.
INSERT FIGURE 5 4 Concluding Remarks
This paper examined a dynamic financial market with endogenous liquidity trading under asymmetric information. Liquidity traders' decisions reflect their disparate valuations of the security, their expected losses to the informed trader and the riskiness of the traded asset. We partition the information about the security's value into public information, tractable information that can be acquired by the informed trader, and intractable information that cannot be acquired. The informed trader acquires a portion of the tractable information set, generating informational asymmetry. The information acquired by the insider is gradually revealed to the market through the informed trader's trades. The intractable information may diffuse to the market over time. Our analysis shows how each of these types of information affects market performance.
We derive the determinants of the adverse selection component of the spread. As the interest rate, speed of public information release, or liquidity trading interest increase, so does the adverse selection spread. As the security's total risk or information asymmetry increases, so does the adverse selection spread. Our model identifies the importance of intractable information and its rate of diffusion to the market as determinants of liquidity and efficiency.
Our results show that compared to models with exogenous noise trading, less information is acquired by insiders and it is disseminated to the market more slowly when liquidity trading is endogenous. The acquisition of some private information by the informed trader increases liquidity traders' welfare, but the informed trader may acquire more information than needed to maximize liquidity traders' welfare. In essence, the informed trader plays the role of an insurer, with the liquidity traders paying him for riskreduction. This risk, however, is not exogenous, and the informed trader acquires more information than the liquidity traders would like.
The informed trader's information acquisition decision depends on whether the market can observe it. The informed trader often has an incentive to hire an auditor to monitor and report his information acquisition investment to the market. An interesting question is what happens if the information acquisition investment is imperfectly observed by the market. If the market observes the level of investment with noise, tractability is lost because the resulting distributions are no longer normal. It can be shown in a simpler setting with discrete asset values that the gist of our results remains intact when the market can observe the informed trader's information acquisition decision with noise. 14 Our model of liquidity trading (Section 1) employs independent liquidity shocks that shift liquidity traders' valuations of the security. An alternative approach [cf. Glosten (1989) , Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) (hereinafter "S&S")] assumes that liquidity trading is driven by hedging motives. The two approaches are substantively different due to the different effects of uncertainty on liquidity traders' behavior, and lead to different equilibrium sets, which we define as the set of parameters for which a linear equilibrium exists. Since the risk-averse hedgers in S&S increase hedging if the asset is more risky, an increase in asset riskiness induces them to trade more, which increases the equilibrium set and may make the market more liquid. With our modeling choice, liquidity traders trade in spite of the risk (rather than in order to offset it), so increased asset riskiness hurts market liquidity and reduces the equilibrium set.
An analysis that compares the results of a single-period version of our model with multiple informed traders (who obtain diverse signals) with those of S&S yields several differences. 15 First, in S&S, increasing the initial uncertainty about the asset's value expands the equilibrium set and sometimes increases market liquidity. With our modeling approach, such an increase always reduces the equilibrium set and decreases market liquidity. Second, in S&S, adding informed traders reduces the equilibrium set, decreases welfare per liquidity trader and sometimes decreases market liquidity. In our model, such an increase always expands the equilibrium set and increases both the welfare per liquidity trader and overall market liquidity. Third, in S&S, adding liquidity traders sometimes decreases market liquidity while in our model, it always increases liquidity. Fourth, contrary to our model, in S&S, increased liquidity trader risk aversion increases liquidity.
Also, increased liquidity trader risk aversion expands the equilibrium set in S&S whereas in our model it doesn't change the equilibrium set. In both models, liquidity trader risk aversion does not affect market efficiency.
Our results have a number of empirical implications: 16 (i) The error variance of the informed trader's signal declines as the cubic root of (1 − t), compared to a linear decline in Kyle (1985) . We propose a GMM-based test of the price-adjustment process in Section 2.2.2.
(ii) Liquidity is positively correlated with the interest rate (Section 2.2).
(iii) The adverse-selection component of the spread is an increasing function of the security's total risk (Section 2.2). 17
(iv) Uncertainty about macroeconomic events (e.g., exchange rates that affect the security's value) increases the adverse-selection spread (Section 2.2).
(v) The effect of changing the investor base on liquidity is larger for riskier securities and for securities with a larger proportion of smaller trades (Section 2.2).
(vi) Both cross-sectionally and over time, the price reaction following an announcement is larger when the uninformed investor base in a security is smaller, where the latter can be proxied by the proportion of retail trades in a stock (Section 3).
(vii) Both cross-sectionally and over time, the price reaction following an announcement is larger when there is more intractable information, where the latter can be proxied by firm size or accounting regime (Section 3).
(viii) Listing a non-U.S. firm in the U.S. reduces the stock's bid-ask spread in its home market and increases information acquisition and research about the firm (Section 3).
(ix) Higher AIMR-FAF scores (for individual securities in the U.S.) and CIFAR index scores (across countries) are associated with more information acquisition and research (Section 3).
Empirical studies that pursue tests of these hypotheses can shed further light on the effects of endogenous liquidity trading on information acquisition, release and market performance.
Figure Legends and for different linear information acquisition costs (c). Shown are the cases of (i) observable inormation acquisition, (ii) unobservable information acquisition, and (iii) endogenous outcome of decision to hire an auditor with audit fee κ = 0.1. For all curves, µσ 2 = a = 1 and Ω 0 = 0.
and L 2 is the space of almost surely square integrable F t ×σ(ξ) adapted processes. When X is differentiable,
we define dX(t)/dt = x(t). The cumulative net quantity of liquidity trading by time t is denoted by Z(t).
Define
(a) At each time point t, each liquidity trader maximizes her utility given available information. For a liquidity trader who arrives at time t ∈ [0, 1] and has immediacy value u, the equilibrium order quantity, z, satisfies:
for all y ∈ IR.
(b) The informed trader maximizes his expected profits:
The informed trader chooses the trading strategy X(t) so that for any given trading strategy Y (t) ∈ H 1 and for all t ∈ [0, 1]:
(c) Market-makers set prices efficiently, that is, the market pricing function satisfies:
In addition to (a)-(c), we impose
, where σ p and σ z are the respective diffusion coefficients of the equilibrium price and liquidity trading processes. These conditions guarantee the stability of the price and cumulative liquidity trading in equilibrium.
We again concentrate on equilibria in linear strategies. Since the equilibrium market price reflects the A.1 present value of the security given all public information, the liquidity traders' strategies do not depend on the security's market price. Let liquidity trader arriving at time t with valuation u play the linear order-placement strategy γ(t)u. 18 The independence of the immediacy values implies that the cumulative net liquidity trading process, Z(t), is an F t adapted Brownian motion with zero drift and instantaneous
In a linear equilibrium, the informed trader applies the following strategy:
or alternatively
A linear pricing schedule for the market-makers satisfies 20 , for λ, λ η real valued functions defined on
where dp(
and W is a standard Brownian Motion on the filtration {F t | t ∈[0, 1]}. We also define A.12) and
In Section 2 (and in the associated proofs given in Appendix B), we in fact solve the liquidity traders' problem without assuming that the trading strategy is linear, and show that linear strategies are indeed optimal.
19 In fact, we show that for equilibrium purposes, (A.7) and (A.8) are equivalent and φ is irrelevant. Considering this, the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the results presented in Section 2 should be considered as uniqueness up to a given irrelevant function φ.
20 This pricing schedule also emerges from the necessary conditions for an equilibrium, and is consistent with the price process being a martingale with respect to the deflated measure (by r). See, e.g., Chapter 5 of O'Hara (1997).
B Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: The solution of the informed trader's problem is, a few details withstanding, similar to the Kyle case and skipped here. The normality of the end value and the cumulative noise trading yield the equations:
from which the desired expressions for λ τ and Σ τ easily follow. Note that determination of λ ητ and irrelevance of φ τ follows from the market efficiency condition.
Liquidity trader j arriving at period τ solves
from the first order condition of which
and second order condition
follow. Since the polynomial
is monotonically increasing in γ τ and negative at γ τ = 0, it follows that (B.4) has a unique root which is strictly positive.
Having obtained the necessary conditions for an equilibrium, we now show its existence. First note that by (B.1), λ τ and β τ must have the same sign. Moreover
Combining these with (11) we obtain
which verifies the second order conditions for both the informed and liquidity trader's problems.
For any given nonnegative α τ and Σ τ , using (11)- (14), we can deduce that λ τ satisfies the fifth order A.3 equation:
which always has a unique root that satisfies (B.8) for α τ > 0. For α τ = 0 (i.e. τ = T ), it can be shown that a positive solution to (B.9) exists if an only if B.10) and that this solution is unique. We can also easily verify that the resulting α τ −1 and Σ τ −1 from this λ τ for any α τ ≥0 are positive. Therefore, we conclude that there exists a unique way to iterate the difference equation system system backwards. Finally, we need to show that for each given Σ 0 that satisfies (7), there is an Σ T that satisfies the equation system. It can be shown that for each 0
where the first inequality in (B.11) is satisfied as an equality if and only if τ = T − 1. Applying (B.11)
iteratively, it follows that if Σ 0 satisfies (7) 
Proof of Proposition 2:
We start by introducing the following mathematical preliminaries. Let a process P (V t , t), where {V t } is the observed net trading volume process be given. For any y ∈ IR, trading strategy X∈H 1 and 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤ 1 define
Define the set of exact control strategies of P for y over [t 1 , t 2 ] as
We call a process P controllable if Θ P,y,t 1 ,t 2 is nonempty for all y ∈ IR and 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤ 1.
Now we show that the conditional expectation process defined by (A.10) is controllable under certain regularity conditions.
Lemma B.1 The process generated by (A.10) , where λ(t) is non-zero a.e. and λ 2 µγ 2 σ 2 is integrable over [0, 1] , is controllable.
Proof: We will show that there exists a linear exact control trading strategy X ∈ H 1 with that Θ P,y,t 1 ,t 2 is nonempty for any y, t 1 and t 2 . To see this, first it can be shown that for any given X with
(B.14)
with boundary condition S P (y, X, t 1 , t 1 ) = (P (t 1 ) − y) 2 . For a linear trading strategy with x(t) = β(t)(y − P (t)), (B.14) turns into B.15) and our problem becomes finding a β : [0, 1]→IR that solves (B.15) with boundary conditions S P (y, X, t 1 , t 1 ) = (P (t 1 ) − y) 2 and S P (y, X, t 1 , t 2 ) = 0. For integrable λ 2 µγ 2 σ 2 , the solution of this problem with arbitrary S P (y, X, t 1 , t 2 ) (and hence free β) is
With almost everywhere nonzero λ it is easy to show that there can be found a β that satisfies S P (y, X, t 1 , t 2 ) = 0. Hence, for any y, t 1 and t 2 , Θ P,y,t 1 ,t 2 is nonempty and the proof of the lemma is complete.
Q.E.D.
Now consider the solution of the informed trader's problem fixing the strategies of marketmakers and the liquidity traders. Suppose λ(t) and γ(t) are given. Then, for any t:
where ξ t ,p(t), p(t) satisfy the stochastic differential equation system 
where σ 2 p (s) = λ 2 (s)µ s γ 2 (s)σ 2 s . By (B.23) we obtain:
Given that σ 2 p and µγ 2 σ 2 are integrable, by the above lemma,p is controllable and
is an F-martingale. From this it follows that for some (positive) constant λ 0 . The condition (B.31) states that for the existence of equilibrium, the objective function has to be "flat" in the sense that as long as it assures (B.27), any (smooth) trading strategy that the informed trader chooses maximizes his expected profits.
Next, consider the liquidity traders. Liquidity trader indexed by j and arriving at time t faces the following problem:
where 
The first order condition is B.36) and the second order condition is
The solution of (B.36) is equivalent to z jt = u jt (2λ(t) + a t (Ω t +Σ(t))) −1 . The second order condition is satisfied for all z since λ(t) > 0 in the equilibrium as we show below. Plugging in λ(t) = λ 0 e t 0 r s ds , we conclude that
Now consider the market efficiency condition. First
from which it follows that λ η (t) = e
Second, the market-makers' observation system equations for ξ t are: In order to complete the proof, we have to revisit two issues that we mentioned above. First, we have to show the positivity of λ 0 and integrability of λ(t). From (B.26) we have
Suppose λ 0 is not positive. Then by (B.14), by making E[x(t)(ξ−P (t))] > 0, the informed trader can assure an arbitrarily large positive S(ξ, X, t, 1) leading to arbitrarily large informed trader profits. Therefore, we conclude that λ 0 > 0 must hold. Integribility of λ(t) immediately follows from (B.32).
A.9
Finally, we have to show that M t (τ ) is an F-martingale in order to verify the solution of the informed trader's problem. To see this notice that for given λ 0 > 0 and
The integrability of σ 2 p can be shown similarly and the proof is complete. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: For r = 0,Σ = Σ and equation (B.46) becomes
(B.54) Solving (B.54), we obtain
Setting Σ(1) = 0 we obtain
Reorganizing (B.56) we obtain the quadratic equation
the solution of which is
An examination of (B.58) gives us that λ 0 > 0 can be satisfied only when 1 0 µ t σ 2 t dt > 4Σ 0 and if that is the case, only one of the roots is positive. Specifically, we obtain (22). Expressions (24) and (25) as in place of λ 0 proves the proposition for r for the specific class of increases on positive measure described above. To generalize the proof to all kinds of increases with positive measure, suppose r 1 and r 2 are given where r 1 is on positive measure greater than r 2 . Notice that for any given ε by a finite number of increases in the above specified class to r 2 , we can obtain r 2 (ε) that satisfies r 1 − r 2 (ε) < ε. Since each step of such an increase decreases λ it follows that λ r 2 (ε) < λ r 2 . Combining this with the continuity of λ as a function of r around r 1 completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
From equations (B.26), (B.27), (B.31) and (B.32) it follows that the ex-ante profit of the informed trader is given by 
Proof of Proposition 5:
In the two stage game, the strategy space of the informed trader will be
Notice that if Λ > µσ 2 /4, it is feasible for the informed trader to choose Σ 0 higher than µσ 2 /4. However,as
shown above in this case the λ 0 that satisfies market efficiency cannot be positive, which allows the informed trader to make arbitrarily large profits and precludes the existence of an equilibrium. Hence, we conclude that there is no equilibrium if Λ > µσ 2 /4. Now suppose that Λ < µσ 2 /4. Then, for any chosen non-negative this is a contradiction and we conclude that Σ r (Λ, Ω 0 , c 1 ) = Σ r (Λ, Ω 0 , c 2 ) must hold. Given this, the second statement of this part follows immediately from (i) and the first statement of (ii). Q.E.D.
A.13
Proof of Proposition 9: Denote the market's perceived Σ 0 by Σ m 0 . Plugging r = a = 0 in (B.62) with constant µ and σ 2 and utilizing (22) 
